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COMMENTS
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LIABILITY IN VIRGINIA FOR
NEGLIGENT INSPECTION OF BUILDINGS, STRUCTURES AND
EQUIPMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a growing trend in Virginia,' as well as in many other states, 2
for injured citizens to hold local governments' liable for personal injuries
and loss of property resulting from the negligent inspection by building
officials 4 of privately owned buildings 5 and structures.' The recent abro-
gation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity7 in the majority of jurisdic-
1. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
2. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
3. For purposes of this article the term "local government" is limited to a discussion of
two distinct entities, municipal corporations and counties. For their respective definitions,
see infra notes 16-17.
4. "Building Officials" are executive officials in charge of local building departments. VIR-
GINIA UNIFORM STATEWIDE BUILDING CODE art. I, § 102.2 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
VUSBC].
5. In Virginia, the term
"Building" means a combination of any materials, whether portable or fixed, having a
roof to form a structure for the use or occupancy by persons, or property; provided,
however, that farm buildings not used for residential purposes and frequented gener-
ally by the owner, members of his family, and farm employees shall be exempt .. ,
but such buildings lying within flood plain or in a mudslide-prone area shall be sub-
ject to flood proofing regulations or mudslide regulations, as applicable. The word
'building' shall be construed as though followed by the words 'or part or parts
thereof' unless the context clearly requires a different meaning.
VA. CODE ANN. § 36-97(12) (Repl. Vol. 1984).
6. In Virginia the term "'Structure' means an assembly of materials forming a construc-
tion for occupancy or use including stadiums, gospel and circus tents, reviewing stands, plat-
forms, stagings, observation towers, radio towers, water tanks, trestles, piers, wharves, swim-
ming pools, amusement devices, storage bins, and other structures of this general nature
. " Id. § 36-97(18).
7. The term "sovereign immunity" represents a doctrine of law which traditionally pre-
cluded litigants from asserting "otherwise meritorious causes of action against a sovereign or
a party with sovereign attributes." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1252 (5th ed. 1979). "Histori-
cally, the federal and state governments, and derivatively cities and towns, were immune
from tort liability arising from activities which were governmental in nature." Id. The his-
tory of sovereign immunity in Virginia has been given exhaustive treatment in several recent
articles devoted completely to that subject. See Eichner, A Century of Tort Immunities in
Virginia, 4 U. RICH. L. REv. 238 (1970); Taylor, A Re-examination of Sovereign Tort Immu-
nity in Virginia, 15 U. RICH. L. REv. 247 (1981); Comment, Municipal Tort Immunity in
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tionss has served to encourage such litigation, but abrogation alone has
proven to be no guarantee of recovery for negligent inspection.9 Rather,
the majority of jurisdictions have continued to enjoy immunity by assert-
ing that building inspectors perform a discretionary governmental func-
tion for which no duty of care is owed to any specific individual or class of
individuals.' ° This defense, often called the "public duty doctrine,"" has
recently been attacked as a" 'duty to all, duty to no-one' doctrine [which]
is in reality a form of sovereign immunity ....
On July 1, 1982 the Virginia General Assembly enacted the Virginia
Tort Claims Act" which expressly abrogated sovereign immunity for suits
arising out of acts or omissions of state employees. 14 The Act specifically
provides, however, that it shall not be construed so as to remove or di-
minish the sovereign immunity of Virginia municipalities or counties. 5
Under Virginia law, municipalities 6 and counties" are treated as sepa-
rate and distinct legal entities.'8 Therefore, to determine the respective
Virginia, 68 VA. L. REv. 639 (1982); J. Clough, Immunity of Virginia Local Government
Employees (May 1984) (unpublished memorandum)(available in T.C. Williams Law School
library).
8. See Taylor, supra note 7, at 262.
9. The mere fact that a governing body has abolished sovereign immunity does not mean
that a negligently conducted inspection will result in liability. See Cracraft v. City of St.
Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 808 (Minn. 1979) ("The abolition of sovereign immunity cre-
ated no new torts.").
10. See infra notes 92-111 and accompanying text.
11. See Comment, Municipal Liability for Negligent Building Inspections - Demise of
the Public Duty Doctrine?, 65 IOWA L. REv. 1416, 1416 (1980).
12. Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 241 (Alaska 1976).
13. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.1 (Repl. Vol. 1984). See generally J. Clough, supra note 7.
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.3 (limiting liability to "$25,000, or the maximum limits of
any liability policy maintained to insure against such negligence or other tort ....
15. Id.
16. The term "municipality" is a general description used to describe local subdivisions of
a state such as cities and towns. BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 822-23 (3d ed. 1969). A
municipality is "a legally incorporated or duly authorized association of inhabitants of lim-
ited area for local governmental or other public purposes. A body politic created by the
incorporation of the people of a prescribed locality invested with subordinate powers of leg-
islation to assist in the civil government of the state and to regulate and administer local
and internal affairs of the community." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 918 (5th ed. 1979).
17. The term "County" refers to the "largest territorial division" of a state for purposes
of local government. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 316 (5th ed. 1979). Counties, unlike munici-
palities, are created by the sovereign powers of the Commonwealth of Virginia "without the
particular solicitation, consent, or concurrent action of the people who inhabit them." Smith
v. Kelley, 162 Va. 645, 649-50, 174 S.E. 842, 844 (1934) (quoting Hamilton County v.
Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109 (1857)).
18. See generally Obenshain v. Halliday, 504 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Va. 1980) (provision of
Virginia law providing for immunity to counties but not to municipalities held not violative
of Equal Protection Clause); Mann v. County Board of Arlington County, 199 Va. 169, 98
S.E.2d 515 (1957) (county held not liable in tort even though it had taken on characteristics
similar to those of municipalities); Smith v. Kelley, 162 Va. 645, 174 S.E. 842 (1934) (Gen-
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liability for negligent acts or omissions of municipal and county building
officials, it is necessary to examine the distinct bodies of case law peculiar
to each.
This article will begin with a brief explanation of local governments'
duty to inspect buildings and structures. This will be followed by a dis-
cussion concerning whether Virginia municipalities and counties may be
held liable for failure to adequately perform that duty in light of the Vir-
ginia Tort Claims Act and recent decisions from other states.
II. LOCAL GOVERNMENT'S DUTY TO INSPECT BUILDINGS, STRUCTURES AND
EQUIPMENT
On July 16, 1982, the Virginia Board of Housing and Community De-
velopment I9 adopted the 1981 edition of the Virginia Uniform Statewide
Building Code20 [hereinafter referred to as the VUSBC]. The VUSBC
"supersedes the building codes and regulations of counties, municipalities
and other political subdivisions and state agencies."'
The VUSBC prescribes building regulations which must be complied
with in the construction of buildings, structures and equipment2 2 within
the Commonwealth.2 3 In drafting the VUSBC the Virginia Board of
Housing and Community Development incorporated by reference several
nationally recognized model building codes.24 Although the vast majority
of technical regulations are contained in the model building codes, the
VUSBC outlines several modifications designed to meet the peculiar
needs of Virginia buildings, structures and equipment.2"
While an important purpose of the VUSBC is "to enhance the safety of
eral Assembly did not intend to give to counties all the powers, duties, and responsibilities
granted to municipalities); Fry v. County of Albemarle, 86 Va. 195, 9 S.E. 1004 (1889) (not-
ing that municipal corporation is created mainly for interest and advantage of its locality,
while county organization is created with a view to the policy of the state at large).
19. The Virginia Board of Housing and Community Development was directed and em-
powered to promulgate, and keep current, a Uniform Statewide Building Code. See VA.
CODE ANN. § 36-98 (Repl. Vol. 1984). The State Board of Housing and Community Develop-
ment was formerly known as the "State Board of Housing." See generally Board of Supervi-
sors v. Miller & Smith, Inc., 222 Va. 230, 279 S.E.2d 158 (1981).
20. VUSBC (1981).
21. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-98 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
22. The term "'Equipment' means plumbing, heating, electrical, ventilating, air-condi-
tioning and refrigeration equipment, elevators, dumbwaiters, escalators, and other mechani-
cal additions or installations." VA. CODE ANN. § 36-97(13) (Repl. Vol. 1984).
23. Id. § 36-99.
24. The VUSBC incorporates by reference the BOCA BASIC BUILDING CODE (1981), BOCA
BASIC PLUMBING CODE (1981), BOCA BASIC MECHANICAL CODE (1981), the NFIPA NATIONAL
ELECTRICAL CODE (1981), and the ONE AND Two FAMILY DWELLING CODE (1979 & Supp.
1980).
25. See generally VUSBC § 101.2-.4 (1981).
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the project itself[,] the dominant purpose . . . is to provide comprehen-
sive protection of public health and safety. '2 To achieve these purposes
the General Assembly made local building departments 27 responsible for
the enforcement of the VUSBC.28
Local building department personnel, who are required to meet mini-
mum qualifications,29 are charged with the responsibility of conducting
inspections to assure compliance with the VUSBC.30 These inspections
may occur before the issuance of a building permit,3 at anytime before
completion of the project,"2 and in some cases, even after its completion. 3
Although the preliminary inspection may be conducted at the discretion
of the building inspector,34 subsequent minimum inspections 35 are
mandatory, 6 as is the maintenance of a record of such inspections.'7
Upon discovery of VUSBC violations, the building inspector must serve
notice'" on the person responsible for the project, and if prompt compli-
ance does not follow, the inspector may issue an immediate stop-work
order,39 or initiate legal proceedings against the violator.40 Violation of
any provision of the VUSBC constitutes a misdemeanor, punishable by a
fine of not more than $1,000.41
Although no plaintiff has been successful in a suit against a Virginia
municipality or county for negligent inspection, litigation over the subject
continues, and the VUSBC may be an important part of a potential
plaintiff's case. This is true because a determination of a negligent inspec-
tion by a municipality or county will likely require: (1) evidence of a prior
violation of a building code, (2) the building inspector's negligent act or
omission in failing to notice or remedy the violation, and (3) injury or loss
26. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Savoy Constr. Co., 224 Va. 36, 44, 294 S.E.2d 811, 817
(1982).
27. The term "'Local building department' means the agency or agencies of any local
governing body charged with the administration, supervision, or enforcement of building
codes and regulations, approval of plans, inspection of buildings, or issuance of permits,
licenses, certificates or similar documents prescribed or required by State and local building
regulation." VA. CODE ANN. § 36-98(10) (Repl. Vol. 1984).
28. Id. § 36-105.
29. VUSBC § 102.4.
30. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-34.4 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
31. VUSBC § 111.1.
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-105 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
33. Id.
34. See VUSBC § 111.1.
35. Id. § 111.3.
36. Id. § 111.2.
37. Id.
38. Id. § 113.2.
39. Id. § 114.1.
40. Id. § 113.3.
41. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-106 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
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of property to the plaintiff as a result of the inspector's negligence. 42
There are approximately fifteen reported cases in which courts have
either rendered judgment against a local government for the negligence of
its building inspector, or intimated that such judgment could be rendered
on the facts presented.43 In none of these cases, however, has a plaintiff
42. This test is a distillation of judicial and statutory authority. See infra notes 70-111
and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., State v. Jennings, 555 P.2d 248, 250 (Alaska 1976) (building official negli-
gently failed to enforce the building code after learning that a hotel, which subsequently
burned down killing eleven people, contained serious violations, such as "inadequate fire
escapes, obsolete fire extinguishers, substandard alarm system and exit signs, improper stor-
age of combustibles, and unsafe construction, including sawdust insulation"); Ellis v. City
Council of City of Burlingame, 222 Cal. App. 2d 490, 35 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1963) (building
official arbitrarily and intentionally refused to issue plaintiff a swimming pool construction
permit despite plaintiff's full compliance with the building code requirements for its issu-
ance); Thomas v. Mayor & Council of Wilmington, 391 A.2d 203 (Del. 1978) (an action
against a city and its building official by purchasers of city residence, based on failure to
discover and inform plaintiffs of certain building code violations prior to the purchase of
their residence, was improperly dismissed by lower court); Trianon Park Condominium
Ass'n v. City of Hialeah, 423 So. 2d 911 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (building official's negli-
gent acts of inspection and certification of the construction of a condominium building were
not governmental functions to which tort immunity would apply); Wilson v. Nepstad, 282
N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 1979) (building official negligently inspected and certified an apartment
building which subsequently caught fire due to building code violations); Smullen v. City of
New York, 28 N.Y.2d 66, 268 N.E.2d 763, 320 N.Y.S.2d 19 (1971) (special duty arose when
city sewer inspector assured plaintiff's decedent that a trench he was working in was safe;
decedent was killed when the trench collapsed shortly thereafter); Sextone v. City of Roch-
ester, 32 App. Div. 2d 737, 301 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1969) (municipality that negligently inspected
and issued a certificate of occupancy could be held liable because it knew, or should have
known, that the person purchasing the property would rely on its actions); Runkel v. City of
New York, 282 A.D. 173, 123 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1953) (city building inspector, contrary to build-
ing code safety requirements, negligently failed to remedy an inherently dangerous situation
created by the existence of a dilapidated house; several trespassing children were injured);
Fitzgerald v. 667 Hotel Corp., 103 Misc. 2d 80, 426 N.Y.S.2d 368 (App. Term 1980) (building
official, despite his personal knowledge of a crack in the weight-bearing wall of a hotel,
failed to enforce building code provisions requiring that the violating building be repaired,
vacated or demolished); Gannon Personnel Agency, Inc. v. City of New York, 103 Misc. 2d
60, 425 N.Y.S.2d 446 (App. Term 1979) (building official negligently inspected the installa-
tion of a new gas pipe line, which subsequently exploded); Halvorson v. Dahl, 89 Wash. 2d
673, 574 P.2d 1190 (1978) (building official was negligent in failing to abate building code
violations which led to a hotel fire; evidence showed he had knowledge of the violations for
at least six months prior to the fire, yet took no action); Campbell v. City of Bellevue, 85
Wash. 2d 1, 530 P.2d 234 (1975) (building official properly inspected an underwater lighting
system, but after discovering dangerous code violations, failed to enforce provisions requir-
ing immediate compliance or disconnection of the system; this failure led to the electrocu-
tion death of a mother attempting to save her son), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Camp-
bell v. Saunders, 86 Wash. 2d 572, 546 P.2d 922 (1976); Rogers v. City of Toppenish, 23
Wash. App. 554, 596 P.2d 1096 (1979) (building official negligently represented a zoning
classification on which the plaintiff justifiably relied, to his economic detriment); Georges v.
Tudor, 16 Wash. App. 407, 556 P.2d 564 (1976) (city and its building official could be liable
for negligent inspection if a special relationship was shown to exist between the injured
8131984]
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recovered against a local government for an inspector's mere failure to
conduct an inspection. The cases suggest a general rule that local govern-
ments will not be held liable for mere failure to inspect." On the other
hand, once an inspection occurs and the inspector discovers, or reasona-
bly should have discovered, code violations for which he negligently fails
to enforce future compliance, liability may attach. 5
III. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION'S LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT INSPECTION
As a general rule, municipalities are liable for the torts of their officers,
agents and employees, provided:
(1) the relationship of master and servant exists between the municipality
and the tortfeasor; (2) the act is within the scope of duties or scope of em-
ployment of the officer or employee ...; and (3) the duty in which the
tortfeasor is engaged is the exercise of a proprietary function rather than a
governmental one."
This last qualification is extremely important because in Virginia, mu-
nicipalities act in a dual capacity; one governmental, the other proprie-
tary.47 Municipalities are immune from liability for negligent acts or
omissions related to the performance of governmental functions, but are
liable for negligent acts or omissions related to proprietary functions."
While no absolute rule can be articulated for determining which func-
tions are proprietary and which are governmental,4 9 "the underlying test
plaintiff and the agents of the municipality); Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526,
247 N.W.2d 132 (1976) (building official negligently inspected an office building's water sup-
ply system, which later proved defective while firefighters were trying to extinguish a fire).
44. 22 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D § 55, at 62 n.2 (1980) ("To date, the right to recover
for failure to inspect has not been recognized in any jurisdiction."). At least one Virginia
circuit court has rejected a claim against a municipality for mere failure to inspect. Daniels
v. Hamlett Constr. Co., Law No. 4277 (Cir. Ct. Roanoke, Va. Apr. 20, 1982).
One court recently made an observation which is applicable to all divisions of local
governments:
Theoretically omniscient and omnipotent, the municipality is, in fact, neither. It ob-
serves and it acts through the eyes and presence of an always inadequate number of
personnel. It cannot possibly ... inspect every site that needs inspection ....
No citizen may successfully sue because damage or injury was sustained in a defec-
tive building or installation which city inspectors had not gotten around to checking
out.
Gannon Personnel Agency, Inc. v. City of New York, 103 Misc. 2d 60, -, 425 N.Y.S.2d
446, 451-52 (1979).
45. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
46. C. RHYNE, THE LAW OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS § 32.12, at 1052 (1980); see
generally 18 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.02 (3d ed. 1984).
47. Taylor v. City of Newport News, 214 Va. 9, 10, 197 S.E.2d 209, 210 (1973).
48. Id.
49. The United States Supreme Court has observed that:
There probably is no topic of the law in respect of which the decisions of the state
[Vol. 18:809
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is whether the act is for the common good of all without the element of
special corporate benefit, or pecuniary profit. If it is, there is no liability,
if it is not, there may be liability."'5 0
For example, Virginia municipalities have been deemed to be perform-
ing a governmental function when engaged in the collection of garbage,5 1
the removal of trees from the roadway after a hurricane, 52 and the main-
tenance of a police force5" or city jail."4 They have been deemed to be
performing a proprietary function when engaged in the maintenance of a
municipal housing project,5 5 the operation of a public swimming pool,56
and the maintenance of public streets and sidewalks.57 Where governmen-
tal and proprietary functions coincide, the municipality will be deemed to
be engaged in a governmental function.5 Therefore, not only must a
plaintiff who is seeking damages for negligent inspection argue that a
building inspection is more like the maintenance of streets and sidewalks
than it is like the maintenance of a police force, the plaintiff must also
argue that there is no overlap of proprietary-governmental functions.
A. The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction
As indicated above, the outcome of a suit against a Virginia municipal-
ity largely depends on whether the activity which caused the injury or
loss of property will be deemed governmental or proprietary. For exam-
ple, in the 1949 case of Masters v. Hart,59 the Virginia Supreme Court
courts are in greater conflict and confusion than that which deals with the differentia-
tion between the governmental and corporate powers of municipal corporations. This
condition of conflict and confusion is confined in the main to decisions relating to
liability in tort for the negligence of officers and agents of municipalities. In that
field, no definite rule can be extracted from the decision.
Brush v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 300 U.S. 352, 362 (1937).
50. Fennon v. City of Norfolk, 203 Va. 551, 556, 125 S.E.2d 808, 812 (1962) (removal of
trees from the roadway after a hurricane was a governmental function) (citing Bolster v.
City of Lawrence, 225 Mass. 387, -, 114 N.E. 722, 724 (1917)).
51. Taylor v. City of Newport News, 214 Va. 9, 197 S.E.2d 209 (1973) (city was held not
liable when plaintiff slipped and fell on grease negligently dropped by city garbage
collectors).
52. See Fennon, 203 Va. 551, 125 S.E.2d 808.
53. City of Winchester v. Redmond, 93 Va. 711, 25 S.E. 1001 (1896).
54. Franklin v. Town of Richlands, 161 Va. 156, 170 S.E. 718 (1933).
55. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Hampton Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 217 Va. 30,
225 S.E.2d 364 (1976).
56. Hoggard v. City of Richmond, 172 Va. 145, 200 S.E. 610 (1939) (This holding has
since been superseded by VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-291 (Repl. Vol. 1981).).
57. City of Norfolk v. Hall, 175 Va. 545, 9 S.E.2d 356 (1940).
58. Taylor, 214 Va. at 10, 197 S.E.2d at 210. (Plaintiff contended that maintenance of
sidewalks is proprietary function, but the court rejected the argument stating that "where
governmental and proprietary functions coincide, the governmental function is the overrid-
ing factor.").
59. 189 Va. 969, 55 S.E.2d 205 (1949).
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was called upon to decide whether the City of Harrisonburg could be held
liable for the negligence of its building official in supervising and inspect-
ing a gas pipe line connection which exploded, killing plaintiff's wife. 0
Because the City had assumed jurisdiction and supervision over the in-
stallation of gas pipe line connections, the plaintiff alleged that it was the
City's failure to discover and remedy the improper connections that was
"the direct cause of the explosion and resulting injuries . . . . 61 Al-
though the court did not reach the question of the City's liability,6 2 it
indicated that if there was sufficient evidence to show that the City was
acting in a proprietary or ministerial capacity, it could be held liable for
negligent inspection.63
The problem with this approach, however, is that the determination of
whether a function is proprietary or governmental is not made until the
court has rendered its decision in the particular case. This fact has caused
some authors to severely criticize continued use of the governmental-pro-
prietary distinction.64 Although the Virginia Supreme Court has not yet
decided if inspections by municipal officials are governmental or proprie-
tary functions, other jurisdictions have.6 5 The general rule has been that
building, structures and equipment inspections are governmental func-
tions for which a municipality is not liable. For example, in City of Tyler
v. Ingram,6  the Texas Supreme Court held that a municipality was not
60. Id. at 971, 55 S.E.2d at 206.
61. Id. at 973, 55 S.E.2d at 207.
62. The court did not reach this issue because it refused to allow the impleading of the
city due to the multiplicity of issues that would have arisen at trial. Id. at 981, 55 S.E.2d at
211.
63. Id. at 981, 55 S.E.2d at 211. Cf. Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, -, 247
N.W.2d 132, 137 (1976) (finding that a building inspector's duties were ministerial: "The
duty to inspect is statutorily imposed. There is no discretion to inspect or not inspect. Vio-
lations exist or do not exist according to the dictates of the regulations governing the inspec-
tion, and not according to the discretion of the inspector.").
64. See 18 E. McQUILLIN, supra note 46, § 53.02, at 134 (judicial attempts to fit particular
conduct into one category or another have resulted in a highly artificial and inconsistent
application of a doctrine which has thereby become "unsound and unworkable."). Cf. Com-
ment, supra note 7, at 641-43 (author explained that, although application of the govern-
mental-proprietary distinction has produced inconsistent results in Virginia, Virginia courts
have nevertheless uniformly accepted its use).
65. 18 E. McQUILLIN, supra note 46, § 53.88, at 500. McQuillin states:
A municipality is not liable for the negligence of its building department which is
created by statute to perform a public service and in which the municipality itself has
no private interest, and from which it receives no special benefit or advantage in its
corporate capacity. Thus, since the performance of such duties is a governmental
function, a city is generally not liable for the negligence of a building inspector in the
performance of his duties.
Id.
66. 139 Tex. 600, 164 S.W.2d 516; accord Fiduccia v. Summit Hill Constr. Co., 109 N.J.
Super. 249, 262 A.2d 920 (1970) (court held that building official's negligent acts of inspect-
ing and issuing a certificate of occupancy for plaintiff's new home were both discretionary-
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liable for its building official's negligent inspection of a section of bleach-
ers which subsequently collapsed, injuring the plaintiff.67 Likewise, in E.
Eyring & Sons Co. v. City of Baltimore," the Maryland Court of Appeals
held that a municipality was not liable for its building official's negligent
inspection of a church roof which subsequently collapsed and caused in-
jury to the plaintiff.6 9
B. Liability for Governmental Functions
The general rule of non-liability for governmental functions is rapidly
becoming less a barrier as jurisdictions abolish municipal sovereign im-
munity"0 and create exceptions to avoid the harshness of the rule. 7' Given
the Virginia General Assembly's failure to abolish municipal sovereign
immunity, injured citizens are forced to seek redress from the court, with
the hope that the court will abolish municipal sovereign immunity, or
that it will find an exception applicable to their particular set of facts.
1. The Inherently Dangerous Exception
Thirty years after the Virginia case of Masters v. Hart,72 the New York
courts had the opportunity to address issues similar to those raised in
Masters. In Gannon Personnel Agency v. City of New York, 73 a building
official approved design plans for the installation of a new gas line which
was intended to service a three story commercial building. After approv-
ing the plans, the building official issued a work permit and workers be-
gan installing the pipe. The man in charge of the work had never in-
stalled such a system before. Consequently, he failed to install a shut-off
valve inside the building where the gas could be turned off in the event of
a leak; and he also left a gas pipe open-ended and uncapped. Both omis-
sions were serious building code violations. 74 However, the building offi-
cial who visited the project for the final inspection told the worker that
he had done a good job, and that the work passed official inspection. Hav-
ing been indirectly assured by the worker that the system was safe and
ready for operation, the building owner arranged to have the gas company
governmental duties which entitled the city to immunity).
67. City of Tyler, 139 Tex. at -, 164 S.W.2d at 519.
68. 253 Md. 380, 252 A.2d 824 (1969).
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 1979) (municipality was treated
like any other private individual or corporation because municipal immunity had been abro-
gated by statute).
71. See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
72. 189 Va. 969, 55 S.E.2d 205 (1949). For a discussion of the facts of Masters, see supra
text accompanying notes 59-63.
73. 103 Misc. 2d 60, 425 N.Y.S.2d 446 (1979).
74. Id. at _ 425 N.Y.S.2d at 449.
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turn on the gas. When the gas was turned on it flowed freely out of the
open-ended pipe resulting in an explosion that left twelve people dead
and many injured. If the building official had inspected the installation as
the applicable building code required, he would have detected the ex-
tremely dangerous violations."
Although the Gannon court recognized the general rule of non-liability
for governmental functions, it reasoned that when the building official
told the inexperienced worker that the system passed inspection and that
it was a job well done, "he not only gave assurances of safety upon which
laymen, and even a sophisticated utility were entitled to rely, but he vir-
tually guaranteed that the forces would be set in motion which eventu-
ated in the explosion. '7 6 The court found the building official's actions
"irresponsible in the extreme . . . .He had to know of the improper in-
stallation-it was his job-and he was derelict in carrying out his du-
ties. '77 Despite a general rule of non-liability for governmental functions,
the Gannon court concluded that liability would attach where, as here, a
building official so negligently carries out his duties that he fails to detect
an "inherently dangerous or imminently hazardous condition. . .[which]
is open, obvious and blatant. .... ,,78
The facts of Masters and Gannon are strikingly similar. In factual situ-
ations similar to these, the "inherently dangerous" exception provides a
viable legal theory on which a plaintiff may recover from a Virginia
municipality.
2. The Special Relationship Exception
Some jurisdictions have chosen to make an exception to the general
rule of non-liability for governmental functions where the building official
was in a special relationship with the injured party which justifiably led
the injured party to rely on the building official's representations.7 9 For
example, in Campbell v. City of Bellevue, ° the plaintiff's wife was killed
and his son injured by an exposed electric wire submerged beneath a
creek on the property of an adjacent home."' The electric wire had been
installed in the creek many years before to operate an underwater light-
75. Id. at , 425 N.Y.S.2d at 448-51.
76. Id. at -, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 458.
77. Id.
78. Id. at -, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 456.
79. See, e.g., Smullen v. City of New York, 28 N.Y.2d 66, 268 N.E.2d 763, 320 N.Y.S.2d 19
(1971) (special relationship found between injured individuals and city officials); Campbell
v. City of Bellevue, 85 Wash. 2d 1, 530 P.2d 234 (1975) (finding a relationship between
injured individuals and city officials, which created a duty to act for the benefit of
individuals).
80. 85 Wash. 2d 1, 530 P.2d 234 (1975).
81. Id. at -, 530 P.2d at 235.
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ing system which had since fallen into disrepair. The exposed wire and
dangerous condition were inspected by the City's building inspector after
a neighbor was electrocuted when attempting to retrieve a dead racoon
found in the creek. The building inspector observed the wiring leading
from the house to the creek and determined that it was in violation of the
applicable building code. At the time he inspected the system, however,
the owner of the property was not at home so the inspector merely placed
a note on the front door which informed the owner that the wiring consti-
tuted a threat to life which, if left uncorrected, would result in the discon-
nection of his electricity. When the caretaker returned home he was not
sure what to do about the notice so he merely turned off the last two
circuit breakers in his circuit breaker panel located in the home, thinking
that one circuit breaker controlled the creek lights.8 2
Subsequent telephone conversations with the City's building depart-
ment assured the neighbors that the problem had been corrected. How-
ever, the building inspector, who had a duty under the Building Code to
immediately sever the unlawful electrical system, took no further action
to assure both compliance with the Code and the safety of the commu-
nity. Meanwhile, the circuit breakers remained in the off position until
six months later when the caretaker turned on the switches to open the
garage door. At that time, plaintiff's son fell into the water receiving a
severe electrical shock; plaintiff's wife was killed while attempting to res-
cue him.83
The City's position was that it was immune from tort liability when
carrying out its governmental duties under the Building Code. 4 Although
the court agreed that the general rule for governmental duties was one of
non-liability, it went on to explain that it would recognize an exception
where a special relationship had developed between the injured plaintiff
and the inspector.8 5 The building official's assurance that the problem
had been corrected, and his subsequent failure to verify that it had been
corrected, caused a special group of people, i.e., plaintiff's son and wife, to
rely on his representations, which in turn led to their respective injury
and death. 6
Other courts have agreed with the special relationship exception to the
general rule of non-liability.87 Based on its decision in Stansbury v. City
82. Id. at -, 530 P.2d at 235-36.
83. Id. at -, 530 P.2d at 236-37.
84. Id. at -, 530 P.2d at 237.
85. Id. at -, 530 P.2d at 239.
86. Id. at -, 530 P.2d at 236.
87. See, e.g., Smullen v. City of New York, 28 N.Y.2d 66, 268 N.E.2d 763, 320 N.Y.S.2d 19
(1971) (shortly before a trench collapsed, killing plaintiff's decedent, decedent had relied on
building inspector's assurance that trench did not need shoring, which was contrary to
building code requirement); Runkel v. Homelsky, 286 A.D. 1101, 145 N.Y.S.2d 729 (1957)
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of Richmond,8 s the Virginia Supreme Court may also be persuaded to al-
low an exception to the general rule when a special relationship is shown.
In Stansbury, the City of Richmond was sued for negligent failure to pro-
vide the plaintiff with sufficient water for domestic and sanitary purposes.
Plaintiff reported the insufficiency to the proper authorities and re-
quested that his residence be connected to another water district; this
request was not immediately granted. The City had recently negligently
devised and adopted the water supply system from which plaintiff's resi-
dence received water.8 9 The Virginia Supreme Court pointed out that as a
general rule, the City cannot be held liable for the performance of activi-
ties which require the exercise of legislative duties involving judgment
and discretion. However, the court explained, "after the work has been
completed, and experience has demonstrated that the system is inade-
quate and insufficient to meet requirements or to effect the objects for
which it was intended, there can be no reason to exempt the municipality
from damage suffered by an individual from its continued use."'" This
exception is directly applicable to a situation where a building official
conducts an inspection, makes a determination that building code viola-
tions exist, but subsequently fails to perform his duty under the building
code by assuring that such violations are abated.
C. The Public Duty Doctrine
The most common defense which serves to insulate local government
entities from liability is called the "public duty doctrine." 92 This doctrine
provides that a municipality's duty to conduct inspections under the ap-
plicable building code is a "public duty" owed to the public at large,
rather than a duty owed to a specific individual or class of individuals. 3
An action for damages based on negligent inspection is, as its name
suggests, an action based on a negligence theory which requires certain
elements to be proven before a plaintiff can recover.9 4 In Virginia, "[tlo
constitute actionable negligence, there must be a legal duty, a breach
thereof, and a consequent injury which could have been reasonably fore-
(court allowed recovery when trespassing children were injured in what the court described
as a dilapidated open structure which constituted a trap or inherently dangerous instrumen-
tality which should have been abated), modified and aff'd, 286 A.D. 1101, 145 N.Y.S.2d 729
(1955) aff'd, 3 N.Y.2d 857, 145 N.E.2d 23, 166 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1957)).
88. 116 Va. 205, 81 S.E. 26 (1914).
89. Id. at 209, 81 S.E. at 27-28.
90. Id. at 209-10, 81 S.E. at 27-28.
91. Id. at 210, 81 S.E. at 28.
92. Comment, supra note 11, at 1424-25.
93. 18 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 46 § 53.04d. For a general discussion of the Public Duty
Doctrine see C. RHYNE, supra note 46 § 32.9; Comment, supra note 11, at 1424-25; 22 Ah.
JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D § 6, at 55 (1980); Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 567 (1972).
94. See generally Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 567 (1972).
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seen by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence."9 5 Thus, the pivotal
issue is whether a building official owes a legal duty to one who receives
injuries as a result of the building official's negligent inspection.
Many states have embraced the public duty doctrine, holding that
building inspections are conducted exclusively for the general public.9 6
Other states have rejected the doctrine, holding that a special duty arises
when a building official undertakes an inspection. This duty is owed to
those particular individuals who could foreseeably be injured if the offi-
cial inspection were negligently performed.9 7
Courts that have adopted the public duty doctrine justify their position
by explaining that imposition of liability on a municipality for negligent
inspection would discourage local governing entities from conducting in-
spections.98 Courts that have rejected the public duty rule reason that it
is better that the government not inspect at all than inspect negligently.99
95. Jordan v. Jordan, 220 Va. 160, 162, 257 S.E.2d 761, 762 (1979) (citing Bartlett v. Re-
capping, Inc., 207 Va. 789, 793, 153 S.E.2d 193, 196 (1967)); Atlantic Co. v. Morrisette, 198
Va. 332, 333, 94 S.E.2d 220, 221-22 (1956). Accord Williamson v. Southern Ry., 104 Va. 146,
149, 51 S.E. 195, 196 (1905) ("negligence only lies where there has been a failure to perform
some legal duty which the defendant owes to the party injured").
96. See, e.g., Duran v. Tucson, 20 Ariz. App. 22, 509 P.2d 1059 (1973) (no municipal lia-
bility where building inspector's negligent failure to enforce fire prevention code prohibiting
open flame heater in work area injured plaintiffs); Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279
N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1979) (no municipal liability where building official overlooked a drum
of duplicating fluid located on a loading dock, which subsequently exploded, killing two
boys and injuring a third); Sanchez v. Village of Liberty, 42 N.Y.2d 876, 366 N.E.2d 870, 397
N.Y.S.2d 782 (1977) (plaintiff's complaint failed to state a cause of action against a munici-
pality for wrongful death of victims of a fire in a multiple dwelling because the statutes
allegedly violated did not require the municipality to exercise care for the benefit of a par-
ticular class); Georges v. Tudor, 16 Wash. App. 407, 556 P.2d 564 (1976) (building official
who negligently issued a building permit and inspected a building under renovation owed no
duty to the individual plaintiff who was injured in subsequent collapse of building).
97. See, e.g., City of Fairbanks v. Nordale Hotel, Inc., 555 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1976) (build-
ing official failed to detect fire code violations during an inspection of a hotel which subse-
quently caught fire); Trianon Park Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 423 So. 2d
911 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (court held that once municipality undertook to inspect the
construction of condominium building, it owed a duty of care to those who could foreseeably
be injured); Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 1979) (court found that legislature
intended to extend a duty of care to plaintiff injured in a fire as a result of building official's
negligent inspection of an apartment building); Fitzgerald v. 667 Hotel Corp., 103 Misc. 2d
80, 426 N.Y.S.2d 368 (App. Term. 1980) (building official breached duty of care owed to
plaintiffs when he failed to enforce code provisions after knowledge of a crack in hotel wall);
Halvorson v. Dahl, 89 Wash. 2d 673, 574 P.2d 1190 (1978) (court found that building code
was enacted for general public as well as specific individual plaintiffs injured in a fire, when
building official had been aware of building code violations for six months but failed to take
remedial action).
98. Comment, supra note 11, at 1438.
99. Wilson, 282 N.W.2d at 667 (the court suggested that if the government abandoned
the business of inspecting, the void might be filled by private enterprises whose certificates
could be relied on by persons risking their lives and property). Contra, Grogan v. Common-
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Fear that local governments may discontinue performing inspections
may be unwarranted in light of modern day insurance policies, which are
as readily available to government entities as they are to private individu-
als and corporations."' It seems more equitable to require local govern-
ments to spread the risk of loss uniformly among their citizens than to
force the injured individuals to bear the entire burden.1"' Equally compel-
ling, however, is the argument that the government simply has no duty to
prevent the misconduct of third parties, 0 2 and "to hold otherwise would
cause the city to become a guarantor of each and every construction pro-
ject - a task not only beyond the scope of the building codes .... but
also one that the City is incapable of performing." 0 3
Plaintiffs in Virginia who seek recovery for negligent inspection must
convince the court that the VUSBC'0 4 was enacted specifically for their
protection. A plaintiff's case is strengthened by the Virginia Supreme
Court's recent statement that, although the dominant purpose of the
VUSBC is to provide comprehensive protection of the public's health and
safety, "we perceive, however, that another important purpose of the
Building Code, with which we are now concerned, is to enhance the safety
of those working on the project'and, indeed, the safety of the project it-
self."'01 5 Two recent Virginia circuit courts, however, failed to recognize
duty created by the VUSBC to any specific individual or class of
persons. 0 6
wealth, 577 S.W.2d 4, 6 (Ky. 1979) (the court reasoned that any inspection capable of alert-
ing landlords to potential hazards and motivating them to make needed repairs is better
than no inspection at all).
100. See Taylor, supra note 7, at 261.
101. Id.
102. Cracraft, 279 N.W.2d at 804. This proposition is supported by RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS § 315 (1977) which provides that:
There is no duty to control the conduct of a third person so as to prevent him from
causing physical harm to another unless
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and third person which imposes a
duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the
other the right to protection.
However, this provision of the Restatement can also be used to support the special relation-
ship exception adopted by some courts. See supra notes 79-91 and accompanying text.
103. Georges, 16 Wash. App. at -, 556 P.2d at 566-67.
104. See supra notes 21-43 and accompanying text.
105. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Savoy Const. Co., 224 Va. 36, 44, 294 S.E.2d 811, 817
(1982).
106. See generally Daniels v. Hamlett Constr. Co., Law No. 4277 (Cir. Ct. Roanoke, Va.
Apr. 20, 1982) (building official's alleged failure to detect inherently dangerous code viola-
tions in an apartment building which later caught fire did not give plaintiffs a cause of
action against the city because "neither the enactment nor the enforcement of the uniform
statewide building code created any duty to any specific individuals"); Hooks v. Stewart,
Law No. 79-1927 (Cir. Ct. Norfolk, Va. June 13, 1980) (plaintiff's allegation of negligent
inspection of a dwelling did not state a cause of action because no duty was owed to plaintiff
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Even in those jurisdictions which retain vestiges of the public duty doc-
trine, that doctrine has been severely undermined. For example, in some
jurisdictions an exception is made when: (1) the building official has ac-
tual knowledge of an inherently dangerous code violation, yet fails to
act;107 (2) the building official's negligent representations cause the plain-
tiff to justifiably rely on them, to his subsequent injury; 08 or (3) when the
applicable building code, by its own terms evidences a clear intent to
identify and protect a particular individual or class of persons.'0 9
Plaintiffs seeking to recover for injuries against a municipality may
have a difficult task in convincing a Virginia court to ignore the govern-
mental aspects of a building official's duties, and to find a duty owed to
the individual plaintiff. However, the "emerging new rule," 10 which is
generally that building and housing codes impose an enforceable duty
upon municipalities to adequately enforce the codes,"' may be useful to
injured plaintiffs seeking relief from governmental immunity.
IV. COUNTY'S LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT INSPECTIONS
As previously discussed,'1 2 Virginia counties and municipalities are dis-
tinctly different legal entities. A municipality is formed by the efforts of
its inhabitants, whereas a county is formed with little or no input from its
inhabitants."' A county is created by the sovereign power of the Com-
as an individual).
107. See, e.g., Runkel v. City of New York, 282 A.D.2d 173, 123 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1953)
(building official knew of violation for fifty days but failed to take corrective action); Fitz-
gerald, 103 Misc. 2d 80, 426 N.Y.S.2d 368 (building official knew of violation for six years);
Campbell v. City of Bellevue, 85 Wash. 2d 1, 530 P.2d 234 (1975) (building official knew of
violation for five months).
108. See, e.g., Smullen v. City of New York, 28 N.Y.2d 66, 268 N.E.2d 763, 320 N.Y.S.2d
19 (1971) (plaintiff's decedent justifiably relied on building inspectors assurance that the
trench was safe).
109. See, e.g., Halvorson, 89 Wash. 2d 673, 574 P.2d 1190 (housing code was enacted not
only for the general public, but also for the benefit of a specifically identified group of per-
sons, of which plaintiff was a member).
110. Id. at -, 574 P.2d at 1192.
111. Id.
112. See supra text accompanying 'note 18.
113. See Smith v. Kelley, 162 Va. 645, 649-50, 174 S.E. 842, 844 (1934), where the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court explained that:
There is a fundamental distinction between municipal corporations and county or-
ganizations. "Municipal corporations proper are called into existence, either at the
direct solicitation or by the free consent of the people who compose them. Counties
are local subdivisions of a State, created by the sovereign powers of the State, of its
own sovereign will, without the particular solicitation, consent, or concurrent action
of the people who inhabit them. The former organization is asked for, or at least
assented to by the people it embraces; the latter is superimposed by a sovereign and
paramount authority. A municipal corporation proper is created mainly for the inter-
est, advantage, and convenience of the locality and its people; a county organization
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monwealth of Virginia, 14 and most of its powers and functions are di-
rectly and exclusively derived from the general policies of the state."'
Hence, the Virginia Supreme Court views counties as mere extensions of
the general administrative arm of the Commonwealth. 1 6 Therefore, in or-
der to determine the amenability of a county to suit for negligent inspec-
tion it is necessary to discuss the liability of the Commonwealth.
Both Virginia statutory law"' and common law l s provide that no suit
can be maintained against the Commonwealth without its express con-
sent. Because a county is considered a state agency, it enjoys similar im-
munity from suit."9 In fact, the Virginia Supreme Court has ruled that
not only is a county entitled to the immunity which is inherent in the
Commonwealth, the county's immunity is "fundamental and jurisdic-
tional and could not be waived" by the county even if it wanted to."0
A. Recent Decisions
In 1890, "Virginia committed itself to the principle that counties were
not liable for tortious personal injuries resulting from the negligence of its
officers, servants and employees.""' This principle of immunity was reaf-
firmed by the Virginia Supreme Court in the recent case of Mann v.
County Board of Arlington.2 ' In Mann, a pedestrian was struck by an
automobile while walking down a county-maintained sidewalk. The pe-
destrian alleged that his injury occurred because the county negligently
maintained a parking area which was adjacent to the sidewalk. The court
is created almost exclusively with a view to the policy of the state at large, for pur-
poses of political organization and civil administration, in matters of finance, of edu-
cation, of provision for the poor, of military organization, of the means of travel and
transport, and especially for the general administration of justice. With scarcely an
exception, all the powers and functions of the county organization have a direct and
exclusive reference to the general policy of the state, and are, in fact, but a branch of
the general administration of that policy."
114. Fry v. County of Albemarle, 86 Va. 195, 198, 9 S.E. 1004, 1005 (1890).
115. Id.
116. See id.
117. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
118. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Hampton Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 217 Va. 30,
32, 225 S.E.2d 364, 367 (1976).
119. Mann v. County Bd. of Arlington County, 199 Va. 169, 173, 98 S.E.2d 515, 518-19
(1957).
120. Id. at 175, 98 S.E.2d at 519. The Virginia Supreme Court has recently explained that
"it is clear that the General Assembly can create a separate entity as an agency of the
Commonwealth to perform a function of state government and that such entity will be
clothed with the Commonwealth's immunity from tort liability." Virginia Elec. & Power Co.
v. Hampton Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 217 Va. at 32, 225 S.E.2d at 367.
121. Fry v. County of Albemarle, 86 Va. 195, 9 S.E. 1004 (1890). The position was recently
reaffirmed in Mann v. County Bd. of Arlington County, 199 Va. 169, 174, 98 S.E.2d 515, 518
(1957).
122. Mann, 199 Va. 169, 98 S.E.2d 515.
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stated that, even if it assumed the county negligently caused plaintiff's
injury, no liability would attach because of "the principle that a county
cannot be sued unless and until that right and liability be conferred bylaw.,,M23
The Virginia Supreme Court's persistent adherence to the doctrine of
county immunity is reflected in an expression of deference to the state
legislature: "[I]f liability for negligent personal injuries is to be imposed
upon it [the county], this should be accomplished through legislative ac-
tion and not by judicial fiat."'2 4 Furthermore, the court stresses that the
mere fact that the county has taken on characteristics of a municipality
will "not justify our disturbance of a settled principle of law and depar-
ture from the doctrine of stare decisis."'2 5 Accordingly, it is not surpris-
ing that counties have continued to enjoy the shield of sovereign immu-
nity when sued for negligent inspection.
In Bergen v. Fourth Skyline Corp.,126 the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit was asked to decide the liability of Fairfax County for
negligent inspection. The county was sued when an apartment building,
which had been previously inspected by a county building official, col-
lapsed during construction. The plaintiff, a worker for a subcontractor at
the construction site, was injured when struck by falling debris. The
plaintiff sued Fairfax County, asserting that its building inspector failed
to enforce the county's building code which in turn caused the building to
collapse. The plaintiff alleged, in particular, that the county inspector had
negligently allowed the use of inferior concrete in the construction of the
building, and that this ultimately led to the injury. The court affirmed
the trial court's dismissal of the suit against the county on the grounds of
sovereign immunity. 21
The Bergen rationale was recently affirmed and broadened in Oben-
shain v. Halliday.28 The Obenshain case arose out of the death of Vir-
ginia politician Richard G. Obenshain, whose plane crashed while at-
tempting to land at Chesterfield County Airport in Virginia on August 2,
1978.129 The suit was instituted by Obenshain's executrix, who alleged
that the plane crashed as a result of malfunctioning runway lights which
caused the pilot to become disoriented and lose control of the plane. The
plaintiff sought damages from the county for negligently failing to assure
compliance with applicable Federal Aviation Administration lighting re-
quirements, and for failure to discover and inform the pilot of the
123. Id. at 174, 98 S.E.2d at 518-19.
124. Id. at 174, 98 S.E.2d at 519.
125. Id. at 175, 98 S.E.2d at 519.
126. 501 F.2d 1174 (4th Cir. 1974).
127. Id. (citing Fry v. County of Albemarle, 86 Va. 195, 9 S.E. 1004 (1890)).
128. 504 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Va. 1980).
129. Id. at 948.
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malfunction. 3 '
The court disposed of the plaintiff's case by explaining that "in Vir-
ginia, counties are immune to actions in tort without statutory con-
sent. ' 131 Because that immunity has not been waived by statute, and is
not waivable by the county itself, the county stands immune from plain-
tiff's action against it in tort.'
The line of relevant Virginia case law strongly suggests that a plaintiff
would not be able to recover directly from a county for the negligence of
its building inspector. There is still the possibility, however, that "parties
injured by tortious acts of a local government's officers or employees may
now have a remedy directly against the state.' 33
B. The Virginia Tort Claims Act
The Virginia Tort Claims Act'3 4 [hereinafter referred to as the Act],
represents a significant change in Virginia law. It is precisely the type of
consent that is needed before a plaintiff may sue the Commonwealth or
an agency thereof. Under the Act, the Commonwealth has made itself
amenable to suit for damages, based on "damage to or loss of property or
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omis-
sion of any state employee while acting within the scope of his employ-
ment under circumstances where the Commonwealth, if a private person,
would be liable to claimant for such damage, loss, injury, or death
"'35
The argument that the Commonwealth may be liable for the negligence
of a county building official stems from the following analysis of statutory
and common law. The Act describes a "state employee" as "any officer,
employee or agent of any state agency, or any person acting on behalf of a
state agency . . . -131 The term "state agency" is defined as "any depart-
ment, institution, authority, instrumentality, board or other administra-
tive agency of the government of the Commonwealth of Virginia ....
As previously discussed, 8" the Virginia Supreme Court has described
counties as "agencies of the State.'1"39 Therefore, if a county is a state
130. Id.
131. Id. at 953; see also J. Clough, supra note 7, at 9.
132. Obenshain, 504 F. Supp. at 954.
133. Hackney, Remarks at the Government Liability Issues Seminar 4 (Apr. 16 & 18,
1984) (available at University of Richmond Law Library reference desk) [hereinafter cited
as Hackney].
134. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-195.1-.8 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
135. Id. § 8.01-195.3.
136. Id. § 8.01-195.2(2).
137. Id. § 8.01-195.2(1).
138. See supra text accompanying note 119.
139. Mann, 199 Va. at 173, 98 S.E.2d at 518.
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agency, county building officials are, by definition, state employees. A
cause of action which is barred against a county may lie against the Com-
monwealth.140 The defect in this conclusion stems from the flush language
within the Act itself, which provides that no provision of this article will
be "applicable to any county, city or town in the Commonwealth or be so
construed as to remove or in any way diminish the sovereign immunity of
any county, city or town in the Commonwealth.' 4' Clearly, this language
evidences an intent to preserve local government immunity. However, it
is doubtful that the Virginia General Assembly has intended to render
some state agencies amenable to suit, while allowing no remedy for torts
committed by comparable employees in comparable agencies. The logical
conclusion must be that the General Assembly intends that plaintiffs in-
jured by negligent acts committed by county employees will name the
Commonwealth, rather than a county, as defendant. This conclusion
seems particularly sound in the area of negligent inspection, given the
fact that the VUSBC is a state regulation imposed on counties for admin-
istration and enforcement.'42
V. CONCLUSION
Under traditional Virginia common law principles, a municipal corpora-
tion may be found liable for negligent inspection if enforcement of the
VUSBC is to be deemed a proprietary function, for which a duty is owed
to the individual plaintiff. A county will be entitled to non-waivable sov-
ereign immunity, regardless of any duty owed to the plaintiff. Thus, ap-
plication of traditional common law principles may yield grossly different
results for the same negligent act, the difference being which branch of
local government is named as defendant.'
4
3
Sovereign immunity is no longer based on sound public policy. State
and local governments should bear the responsibility for the negligent
acts of their employees by acquiring adequate insurance policies, thereby
spreading the risk of loss evenly among all their citizens. Common sense
suggests that a building official's duties require highly technical skills
140. See Hackney, supra note 133. Although the state's liability for negligent inspection
is a subject beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted that the mere abolition of
sovereign immunity would create no new torts. See Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279
N.W.2d 801, 808 (Minn. 1979). Thus, when bringing an action for negligent inspection
against the state the plaintiff will have to be prepared to argue that the state owed him a
duty as an individual, that the duty was breached, and that the breach caused the injury.
See supra text accompanying note 112.
141. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.3 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
142. This analysis is equally applicable to suits arising out of negligent inspections by
municipal building officials. Hackney, supra note 133, at 4.
143. This inequitable treatment was found not to violate the Equal Protection Clause of
the fourteenth amendment in Obenshain v. Halliday, 504 F. Supp. 946, 954 (E.D. Va. 1980).
See generally J. Clough, supra note 7.
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which, if performed negligently, could result in great loss of property and
human lives. Government, like any other employer, should be required to
employ only well-trained inspectors, upon whose assurances of safety so-
ciety can rely. If our government continues to monopolize the trade of
"inspection," let it do so responsibly, or stand prepared to compensate
the victims of its negligence. The recently enacted Virginia Tort Claims
Act 1 44 may serve to remedy traditional inequitable treatment by provid-
ing Virginia plaintiffs who seek recovery for negligent inspection with a
single and amenable defendant.
Matthew W. Broughton
144. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
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